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Introduction
The law of contracts has generally been understood in the context of the capitalistic
market. Encouraged by the eighteenth century pre-market economy, ideas of freedom of
contract bloomed in the nineteenth century laissez faire period. Among the results of this
period were standard form contracts, exclusion clauses and a strict adherence to the
construction of the terms agreed upon. However, the law of contract has undergone much
transformation. It is submitted that what may be described as a former traditional treatment
of contract law has now been gradually replaced by a modern treatment of contract law. This
modern period of contract law has seen the rise in the use of doctrines such as
unconscionability' and reasonableness' to provide more equilibrium and fairness between
contracting parties. Besides these, the principle of unjust enrichment has advanced the law of
restitution to provide restitutionary relief.' and in equity, the fiduciary and constructive trust
principle has made equitable remedies attractive in the commercial world.4
.
This paper focuses on yet another modern armour in the law of contract, that is, the
doctrine of good faith. Unlike the other doctrines that have by now, found some acceptance,
the doctrine of good faith has raised both optimism and pessimism by virtue of its rather
amorphous nature. Despite the skeptics, the concept of good faith is already incorporated in
significant international instruments. The paper will set out the position of good faith in the
civil law system where it is well established, its treatment in the United States and its
incorporation in international instruments. In the United Kingdom, the concept of good faith
is not accepted and the views for and against good faith will be considered. In Australia,
there have been significant developments in advancing good faith in contract law. Finally,
this paper will consider the position in Malaysia.
I See the classic Australian Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 and developments
thereafter. The English courts have not been as open to the doctrine although there are some significant cases,
see for eg Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch. [1997] 1 All ER 144. In Malaysia, the doctrine is
beginning to be recognized, see Saad Marwi v Chan Hwan Hua & Anor [2001] 3 CLJ 98; for a commentary on
the Malaysian development, see Cheong, May Fong "A Malaysian Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power
and Unconscionability After Saad Marwi,? [2005] 4 MLJ i-xii.
2 This concept is used particularly to control exclusion clauses and clauses in restraint of trade.
J See the seminal text, Lord Goff of Chivelry & Jones, Gareth, Law of Restitution (London: Sweet & Maxwell,
6th ed, 2002). For a Malaysian article, see Cheong, May Fong, "Restitutionary Developments under Part VI,
Malaysian Contracts Act 1950" [2005] Asian Law 22-42.
4 For eg, see two article from the English and Australian perspectives, see Millet, PI, "Equity's Place in the Law
of Commerce" (1998) 114 LQR 214-227, Mason, Anthony, "The Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the
Contemporary Common Law World" [1994] 110 LQR 238-259 respectively. For a Malaysian perspective, see
Malik Imtiaz Sarwar, "Equity and Commerce" [1997] 3 MLJ cxlix-c1xxvii.
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3Good Faith in the Civil Law System
The term "good faith" is difficult to define and has been described in terms of bona
fides, and honesty. It also includes a consideration of the legitimate interests of others and in
commercial transactions, it may be best understood in terms of fair dealing or at the very
least, reasonable standards of fair dealing.
Despite the seemingly vague descriptions above, the concept of .good faith has been
well established in the continental law/civil law system. In Germany, S 242 of the German
Civil Code (Das Burgerliches Gesetzbuch: BGB) provides that contracts must be performed
in the manner required by good faith and fair dealing, taking into consideration the general
practice in commerce. Similarly, Article 1134 of the French Civil Code also stipulates that
contracts must be performed in good faith. The Italian Civil Code is more specific and
requires good faith in three aspects of contract law, that is, in negotiation (article 1337);
interpretation (article 1366) and in the performance of contracts (article 1375). Together with
more specific codes, these general provisions on good faith have been effectively used to
control contractual unfairness in these jurisdictione.'
Good Faith in International Instruments
The concept of good faith has been used in various international commercial
instruments. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for International Sale of Goods
(1980) provides that in interpreting the Convention, "regard is to be had to ... the observance
of good faith in international trade". Similarly, article 1.7 of the UNIDROIT General
Principles for International Commercial Contracts provides that parties should "act in
accordance with good faith and fair dealing".
The European Commission has adopted the concept of good faith in its documents as well.
The Directive on Commercial Agents of 1986 provides for the reciprocal duties of principal
and agent. The principal and agent is to 'act dutifully and in good faith' in relation to each
other. An important document of great impact is the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer
Contracts of 1993 which have been followed in the United Kingdom Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. An "unfair term" is defined as follows:
" ... any term which contrary to the requirement of good faith causes a significant
imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment of
the consumer".
This definition has received much commentary. One of the chief concerns is the role played
by good faith in the light of the element of "significant imbalance in the parties' rights and
obligations"? and thus. whether it is necessary for the consumer to establish the state of mind
or the motives of the supplier.i
Good faith also accepted in the United States
S See Collins, Hugh, "Good Faith in European Contract Law" (1994) 14 Oxford 1Legal Stud 229-254.
6 Willet, Chris, "Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts" [1994] Consumer Law lourna1114-123 at
r 120.
Waddams, SM, "Good Faith, Unconscionability and Reasonable Expectations" (1995) 81CL 55-68 at p 61.
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The Uniform Commercial Code, section 1-203 states as follows:
"every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith and
fair dealing in its performance or enforcement".
Good Faith is defined in section 1-201(19) as "the observance of reasonable standards of fair
dealing in the trade". This position has been reinforced in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts (1981) where section 205 provides that "every contract imposes upon each party a
duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement"
But not in English Law
Besides the exceptional positron in insurance contracts where the principle of
uberrima fides (utmost good faith) applies, English law has traditionally and still, does not
accept the concept of good faith in their general law.s The English position rejecting a
concept of good faith is often attributed to Bingham LJ's statements in Interfoto Picture
Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltc! as follows:
In most civil law systems, and perhaps in most legal systems outside the common law
world, the law of obligations recognizes and enforces an overriding principle that in
making and carrying out contracts parties should act in good faith. This does not
mean that they should not deceive each other ... ; its effect is most aptly conveyed by
such metaphorical colloquialisms as 'playing fair,' 'coming clean' or 'putting one's
cards face upwards on the table.' It is in essence a principle of fair and open dealing
English law has, characteristically, committed itself to no such overriding principle
but has developed piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of
unfaimess.l"
The English courts have preferred to use other specific principles rather than the good faith
concept as seen in the control of exclusion clauses. LJ Bingham continued as follows:
The tendency of the English authorities has .,. been to look at the nature of the
transaction ... and the character of the parties to it; to consider what notice the party
... was given of the particular condition ... ; and to resolve whether in all the
circumstances it is fair to hold him bound by the condition. This may yield a result
not very different from the civil law principle of good faith, at any rate so far as the
c. • f . d IIformation 0 contract IS conceme .
A more recent view was given in Walford v Miles.12 In this case, Lord Ackner stated as
follows:
I A similar position has been argued for Canada, see Bridge, Michael, "Does Anglo-Canadian Law need a
Doctrine of Good Faith" (1984) 9 Can Bus LJ385-426 at p 412.
9 [1989] QB 433.
10 Ibid at p 439.
11 Ibid at p 445.
12 [1992] 2 AC 128
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[T]he concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently repugnant
to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in negotiations. Each party to
the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) own interest, so long as he avoids
making misrepresentations ... A duty to negotiate in good faith is unworkable In
practice as it is inherently inconsistent with the position of a negotiating party. 13
The English courts' rejection against a doctrine of good faith has been due to various
underlying policy considerations. The next part sets out the views against and for, the
inclusion of good faith into the general law of contract.l"
Arguments against Good Faith
One concerns for having a good faith element in contract law is that the doctrine in
requiring parties to take into account the legitimate interests/expectations of the other is
incompatible with adversarial ethnic underpinning English contract law.ls Following the
adversarial system, each party takes care of his or her interest which is best seen from the
litigation process in the courts where each counsel is expected to raise matters which will
assist his client's case.
Another wider concern is that allowing the good faith element to take root in contract
law is akin to setting off a loose canon resulting in 'palm tree justice'. Good faith cannot be
distinctly defined and while it presupposes a set of moral standards, the question is whose set
of standard that should be? Further, should it be a subjective or objective standard of good
faith? A subjective standard would involve the knowledge or absence of facts and events.
For instance, in matters affecting property law and possession, the issue of the bona fide
purchaser for value is pertinent. An objective standard is the accumulation of external
community norms and standards and over a period of time, this has been distilled into rules as
in Germany's Civil Code.
The other important issue is whether good faith should be a procedural or substantive
concern? In this regard, it is pertinent that even though the doctrine of unconscionability has
received clearer acceptance in the common law world, the issue of substantive or procedural
unconscionability has not been fully determined.i" If good faith is to be incorporated into a
procedural conduct element, which or all contractual phases should it cover: whether at the
formation, performance or enforcement of the contract. The same question arises for the
substantive element; should it be considered for in the contract terms concerning
performance, termination or enforcement.
A strong argument against good faith regulating substance is that it will impinge on
the autonomy and freedom of contract. To the ardent supporters of the market economy, this
will erode the very foundation of contract law itself. Freedom of contract and the adherence
13 Ibid at 138.
14 See for eg, the Fourth Annual Journal o/Contract Law Conference ("Good Faith and Fairness in Commercial
Contract Law") held in London in September 1993. Some of the papers have been published in the Journal 0/
Contract Law. See also, Beatson, Jack & Friedmann, Daniel (eds), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995)
IS See for eg, Walford v Miles discussed above.
16 See for eg, Dugan, Robert, "The Application of Substantive Unconscionability to Standardized Contracts - A
Systematic Approach" (1982-83) 18 New Eng L Rev 77-108.
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of terms agreed to is also necessary to ensure certainty in business. This has been an
argument used to ward off attemrts to apply the doctrine of unconscionability in Union Eagle
Ltd v Golden Achievement Ltd. 7 In this case, the deposit for the sale and purchase of a
property wsa already paid. However the purchaser was ten minutes late in completing the
purchase as a clause in the agreement provided that completion must be made before 5.00 pm
on September 1991. Clause 12 provides that in the event of failure to comply with any terms,
the deposit to be forfeited and the vendor had the option to rescind. The Privy Council held
that terms had to be adhered strictly out of the practical considerations of business. The
Board stressed that parties should know with certainty that terms agreed will be enforced.
It is also argued that requiring a goof faith element will involve difficult inquiries of
the contractor's state of mind in a search of a person's motives which is often mixed.
Allowing an undefined discretion to refuse enforcement on the basis that it is not in good
faith is sufficient to create uncertainty. And even if that discretion is not exercised, the
existence of such discretion itself enables litigation to be employed as a negotiating tactic.
This by itself will cause injustice that cannot be fully compensated by the ultimate decision of
the case.
Finally, not all contracting contexts are alike and good faith cannot be imposed across
the board. For example, in the commodities market, dealings are intrinsically competitive
and as such opportunistic behavior is expected. Even if a good faith requirement is imposed,
how should it be framed: whether as a negative element of non-exploitation, non-
opportunism, non-shirking or should it be a positive requirement of cooperation, support,
assistance. Many of these issues remain to be debated and analysed both from a juristic and
commercially practical point of view.
Positive Support for Good Faith
The proponents of a good faith element in contract law have argued that rather
than regulating bad faith, it is better to address the issues directly with a good faith doctrine.
This is particularly relevant in the area of contractual fairness to ensure both parties achieve
fair results. It has been said that good faith as an umbrella principle is useful to cover, unify
and fill in the necessary gaps between the ranges of available specific doctrines. Thus, where
the factual matrix does not allow the application of the doctrine of unconscionability nor
estoppel, and yet there is unfairness or injustice involved, good faith may prove helpful in
deciding the form of relief. In this respect, in light of various underlying doctrines and
themes in contract law, good faith may also be seen as the middle ground between
unconscionability and the fiduciary principle. Finn describes it as follows:"
"Unconscionability" accepts that one party is entitled as of course to act self-
interestedly in his action towards the other. Yet in deference to that other's interests,
it then proscribes excessively self-interested or exploitative conduct. "Good faith",
while permitting a party to act self-interestedly, nonetheless qualifies this by
positively requiring that party , in his decision and action, to have regard to the
legitimate interests therein of the other. The "fiduciary" standard for its part enjoins
one party to act in the in interests of the other - to act selflessly and with undivided
17 [1997] 2 All Er 215,218-219
1& Finn, PD, "The Fiduciary Principle" in Youdan, TG (ed) Equity. Fiduciaries and Trust (Toronto, Calgary,
Vancouver, 1981) 1.
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loyalty. There is, in other words, a progression from the first to the third: from selfish
behaviour to selfless behaviour.19
It has also been argued that good faith aids in protecting reasonable expectations of
contracting parties. Thus, it is argued that when parties enter into contracts, they intend to
perform and receive the fruits of the bargain. In this respect, the element of good faith will
contribute to a culture of trust and cooperation and thus enhances the autonomy of contractors
and ultimately the market economy as a whole.
Good Faith Developments in Australia
One of the primary cases in support of a good faith requirement is Priestly LJ's
decision in Renard Construction (ME) Pty Ltd vMinister for Public wons." In this case, a
clause in the building contract authorized the principal to take over the whole or any part of
the contract or cancel the contract, if contractor fails to comply with the principal's direction,
however minor or accidental it might be, and regardless of importance or otherwise of its
subject matter. The Court held that the party has to exercise the power reasonably and views
were opined that this is a strong case for Australia to adopt the concept of good faith in the
performance and enforcement of contract, as prevailing in Europe and in the United States.
This case was followed in various cases later."
In two other cases, the Australian courts have implied the duty of good faith and fair
dealing in contracts. In Hughes Aircraft Systems International V Airservices AustralicP
which involved the procurement of contracts by a competitive tender process, the Court held
that a public body has a duty to deal fairly with the tenderers in the performance of the
contract. This duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied by law in all contracts.
Similarly, in Aleate! Australia Ltd v Scarcella,23 the Court implied a duty of good faith in
performing obligations and exercising rights in relation to a lease. The Court held that the
lessee was not in breach of the implied duty of good faith for demanding more fire safety
requirements if it thought that Council's existing requirements were insufficient.
However, not all judges have accepted the good faith doctrine. Different view were
given in Service Station Association Ltd v Berg Bennet & Associates Pty ua" and Gummow
J had preferred precise rules rather than general overarching principles.
An interesting case where the facts are very relevant is Burger King Corp v Hungry
Jack's Pty ua" In this case, Burger King had franchise agreements with Hungry Jack's for
a term of 15 - 20 years with provisions for one renewal of the same term. Under one of the
agreements, Hungry Jack's had an unrestricted and non-exclusive right to develop franchised
restaurants throughout Australia. The agreement was for 5 years, with renewal provisions,
provision for termination for breachand a 30 day notice was required to be given in respect of
any breach capable of cure. From 1993, Burger King decided to enter the Australian market,
19 Ibid, at p 4.
20 (1992) 26 NSWLR 234.
21 See the Burger King case discussed below, see also Hughes Bros Pty Ltd v Trustees of the Roman Catholic
Churchfor the Archdiocese of Sydney. (1993) 31 NSWLR 91. -
22 (1997) 146 ALR 1.
23 (1998) 44 NSWLR 349
24 (1993) 117 ALR 393
25 (2001) NSWCA 187. See also a later case, Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney Council
(2002) 186 ALR 289,312,327.
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either by buying out Hungry Jack's or forming a joint venture arrangement. During 1994, the
parties entered into discussions with the Shell Oil Company Australia about the feasibility of
establishing outlets in Shell service stations under the brand name "Hungry Jack's" as a
tripartite venture. However, during the course of these discussions, Burger King began
dealing with Shell separately, and concluded an agreement, without Hungry Jack's
knowledge. There werre continuing disputes between the parties which intensified from
1993-1995. In late 1996, and again in 1997, Burger King served notices of termination on
Hungry Jack's. One of the issues was whether these purported terminations were valid and
whether Burger King had breached its implied obligations of good faith and reasonableness
in the agreement.
Rolfe J held that Burger King had breached the implied term of good faith that Burger
King must act in good faith in the exercise of its contractual powers. Further, Burger King
also breached two other implied terms. First, Burger King had breached the implied term of
cooperation to do all that was reasonably necessary to enable Hungry Jack's to enjoy the
benefits of the agreement. In this case, Burger King had delayed in making necessary
communications and failed to comply with process requirements which resulted in Hungry
Jack not meeting its contractual obligation. Secondly, Burger King had breached the implied
term of reasonableness to act reasonably in exercising its powers under the agreement. Rolfe
J held that Burger King could not take advantage of its own inappropriate behavior and
therefore awarded Hungry Jack $60 million damages for delay in opening restaurants, loss of
opportunity to introduce third party franchisees and loss of service royalties. Burger King
appealed.
The New South Wales Court of Appeal'" dismissed Burger King's appeal. The Court
agreed with the Rolfe J's decision that the failure to comply with the contract as well as the
use of contractual provisions for improper purposes amounted to a breach of good faith and
reasonableness. It was a wrongful repudiation which justified compensation through
damages. Thus, the purported termination was invalid.
In arriving at its decision, the Court referred to statements of Priestly JA in Renard's
case regarding the expectations of good faith behaviour. The Court also cited Alcatel 's case
which implied terms on good faith and reasonableness. In Alcatel's case, Sheller lA's
extended the implication of such terms into commercial contracts, in relation to performing
obligations and in exercising rights. In Burger King case, the Court also held that there was
no difference in the elements of good faith and reasonableness?7 From this decision, it can
be concluded that the Court applied both the positive and negative elements in viewing good
faith, that is, a duty to cooperate to ensure the other party obtain the fruits of its bargain and
at the same time, not to act in a manner to prevent the performance of or withhold the
benefits from the contract.
The Malaysian Position on Good Faith
In Malaysia, the concept of good faith in contract is a relatively new concept and is
not developed. Neither has it seen the same kind of corresponding Australian development as
26 Consisting of Sheller, Beazley and Stein JJA
27 Cf a different view on this, see Peden, Elisabeth, Good Faith in the Performance of Contracts (LexisNexis
Butterworths Australia, 2003) pp 176-178
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seen in other concepts such unconscionability.Y or estoppel" In these latter concepts, the
developments in Australia were later followed in the Malaysian local cases.
There are a few cases concerning good faith in contract law." In an early case,
Pasuma Pharmacal Corpn v McAlister & Co. Ltd,3l concerning a five year agreement
concerning the distribution of stocks of chicken essence," the Federal Court allowed
Pasuma's appeal. Thomson LP held that looking at the circumstances of the contractual
relationship between the parties, "it is difficult to resist the conclusion that there was an
implied condition that in relation to their business. as covered by the contract the parties
should be reasonably honest and truthful with each other".33 It is pertinent that the Court
referred to the implied condition and in acknowledging good faith, applied an objective
standard.
In Perbadanan Kemajuan Ekonomi Negeri Johor v Lim Shee Pin & Anor,34 the
plaintiffs accepted tenders from the defendants to extract timber from virgin land at a stated
tender price. However, the defendants found out later that the land was not virgin land and
refused to pay the full amount. The defendants made a representation to the Forest
Department which had originally permitted the plaintiffs to extract timber and the Forest
Department agreed to reduce the whole workable area from 2,060 acres to 776 acres. The
plaintiffs however refused to reduce the tender price pro rata on the ground that the
defendants could have inspected the area since they had the means and opportunity to do so.
Thus, they should have realized the error. The High Court held that the plaintiff should have
in equity and good conscience reduced the amount payable to them pro rata. The Court thus
reduced it accordingly.
In Ho Shee Jan v Stephens Property Sdn Bhd,35 the Court invoked the doctrine of
estoppel by conduct as well as requirements of good faith and fair dealings in the
performance of the contract. In this case, the plaintiff was the transferee of shares held in the
defendant company. The Articles of Association of the company required the transfer form
to be sent to the company's registered office. Although the plaintiffs transfer form was sent
to the company secretary instead of the company's registered office, the company
28 Thus, Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447 referred to in Saad Marwi v Chan Hwan
Hua & Anor [2001] 3 CLJ 98 (Court of Appeal).
29 Thus, Walton Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387 was followed in Boustead Trading (1985)
Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Sdn Bhd[1995] 3 MLJ 331 (Federal Court)
30 This part will not deal with issues of good faith in specific contracts such as contracts for sale and purchase of
land. In this respect, see particularly, section 26 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 concerning relief against parties
and persons claiming under them by subsequent title, providing for the exception of a transferee for value who
has paid his money in good faith and without notice of the original contract. For a case of good faith on
partnership agreements, see the Federal Court decision of Vasu Devan SlO TK. Nair & 2 Ors v Velu Achuthan
Nair (1985) 1 CLJ 160.
31 (1965) 1MLJ 221 (Federal Court) Civil Appeal from Singapore.
32 Under the agreement, McAlister was to by from Pasuma all the chicken essence they could sell and it was to
sell it under their "Appollo" trade mark. It was also agreed that McAlister was not to sell it outside the area
covered by the agreement and vice versa, Pasuma was not allowed to sell chicken essence in the area covered by
McAlister. Later, both parties agreed to add a new provision that Pasuma was to replace any defective stock
supplied by them. Disputes arose relating to performance and Pasuma alleged that McAlister had allowing
stocks of inferior quality to remain in the market despite an undertaking that they would replace old stock with
new ones delivered by Pasuma. Pasuma also alleged that McAlister had fraudulently inflated the amount of
chicken essence to be replaced by Pasuma.
33 Ibid, at pg. 226
34 (1986) 1MLJ 184.
35 (1986) 2 MLJ 43
8
.0
acknowledged receipt of the plaintiffs form and advised him that his application had been
tabled before the company board on 1December 1980. The Articles of Association expressly
provide that if the directors refused to register a transfer, a notice of the refusal must be
served on the transferee within one month after the date on which the transfer was lodged.
Five months later the plaintiff was informed that his application for the transfer of the shares
was refused by the board of directors. On the plaintiffs application to the court for the
registration of the shares, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs transfer form was not
properly lodged as required by the Articles of Association. The Court held that the company
was estopped by its conduct and that it must be fair in its dealings. In this case, it would be
unfair or unjust to allow the company to say that the lodgement of the transfer form was
invalid since the board had led the plaintiff to believe that the lodgement was valid by
holding a board meeting to consider the transfer without questioning its lodgement.
Conclusion
The above comparative survey of the extent of acceptance of a good faith element in
contract law shows variation among jurisdictions. The origin and continued use of good faith
in the civil law system shows its viability despite its broad and general nature. In the
common law system, the Australian developments in the light of the traditional common law
as shown in the current position in the United Kingdom, is a refreshing approach to
supporters of modem contract law. However, the incorporation of the good faith element in
the EC Directive which is followed in the UK Regulation, on unfair terms in consumer
contracts, will likely influence the English position in future as more cases are decided and
the Directive interpreted by the courts. In Malaysia, there does not appear to be any
immediate impetus to develop the concept of good faith in contract law. However, in light of
the function of good faith as an umbrella doctrine to promote fairness and equality between
contracting parties, Malaysian lawyers and the courts should continue to have an open
approach to develop this doctrine.
@CheongMayFong
14 December 2006
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Recent developments in Malaysian law of passing off
The tort of passing off occurs where a trader misrepresents that his goods or services are
those of the plaintiff so as to cause damage to the plaintiffs business goodwill. The law of
passing off is concerned with misrepresentations made by one trader which damage the
goodwill of another. The theoretical basis for an action in passing off is the protection of a
property right which the plaintiff has in the goodwill of his business.' There is no right of
property in a plaintiffs trade mark or other distinguishing indicia which he uses to
distinguish his goods or services from those of other traders in the marketplace?
The law of passing off in Malaysia is based on the English common law principles of passing
off. This is because section 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956 provides that West Malaysia shall
receive the common law of England and the rules of equity as administered in England on 7
April 1956. By the same section, Sabah and Sarawak received the common law of England
and the rules of equity together with statutes of general application as administered in
England on 1December 1951 and 12 December 1949 respectively.
In modern times, as new and sophisticated marketing techniques develop, the boundaries of
the law of passing off have expanded so as to meet changing conditions and practices in
trade. The ability of the law of passing off to respond to commercial progress reflects the
flexible nature of the tort. Since the beginning of the 21st century, a number of interesting
cases were decided which are likely to shape the further development of the law of passing
off in Malaysia. First, as the last century drew to a close, there was a trend among Malaysian
judges to willingly find the existence of goodwill despite very minimal trading activity in the
country. This trend has taken a step further in the recent case of Thrifty Rent-A-Car System
Inc v Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sdn Bhd & Anor.' The court in that case stated, in obiter, that
reputation, as opposed to goodwill, was sufficient for a passing off action. Secondly, where
well-known trade marks are concerned, the recent case of McDonald's vMcCurry Restaurant
(KL) Sdn Bhct suggests that judges are more amenable to find the existence of
misrepresentation and confusion among the public. Thirdly, Malaysian judges have accepted
that dilution of trade marks is a form of actionable damage in passing off. However, what
amounts to the dilution of trade marks, the prerequisites for establishing that dilution has
occurred and the issue of whether the concept of dilution fits within the theoretical
framework of the law of passing off have not been addressed by Malaysian judges.
Proving an action for passing off
In Erven Warnink BV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd,5 Lord Diplock in the House of Lords
laid down five minimum requirements which must be established by the plaintiff in a passing
off action. These five requirements are as follows:
(i) misrepresentation
(ii) made by a trader in the course of trade
1 Star Industrial ComparT)'Ltd v Yap Kwee Kor [1976] 1 MLJ 149, Boh Plantations Sdn Bhd v Gui Nee Chuan
& Ors [1975] 2 MLJ 213. Although the rationale of the law of passing off is to protect the goodwill of traders,
consumers benefit at the same time because they are protected against misinformation which may distort
consumer choice.
2 Spalding (AG) & Bros v AW Gamage Ltd (1915) 32 RPC 273, Star Industrial Company Ltdv Yap Kwee Kor,
ibid at 155 per Lord Diplock.
3 [2004]7 MLJ 567.
4 D6-22-989-2001 (decision delivered orally in chambers by Siti Mariah Ahmad Jon 7 September 2006).
s [1980] RPC 31 at 93.
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(iii) to prospective customers of his or ultimate consumers of goods or services supplied
by him(iv) which is calculated to injure the business or goodwill of another trader (in the sense
that this is a reasonably foreseeable consequence)
(v) which causes actual damage to a business or goodwill of the trader by whom the
action is brought or (in a quia timet action) will probably do so.
The applicability of these requirements to passing off actions in this country was confirmed
by the Malaysian Supreme Court in Seet Chuan Seng & Anor v Tee Yih Jia Foods
Manufacturing Pte Ltd.6 Lord DiplocK's formulations were further reduced to three elements
by Lord Oliver in Reckitt & Colman (Products) Ltd v Borden Inc.? These elements are
goodwill, misrepresentation and damage, which collectively are often termed the 'classic
trinity' .
Attack on goodwillGoodwill is normally created by conducting business in this country" and very slight business
activity has been held to be sufficierit.9 In Inland Revenue Commissioners v Muller & Co
Margarine ua: 0 Lord Macnaghten described goodwill as 'the benefit and advantage of the
good name, reputation and connection of a business .,. the attractive force which brings in
custom'. Goodwill has no independent existence apart from the business to which it is
attached/" The law of passing off makes a distinction between the goodwill of a business
which uses the trade mark and the reputation of the trade mark itself. Although a trade mark
may be known in this country and, thus, enjoys local reputation, it does not necessarily follow
that goodwill in the business which is sustained by that trade mark exists here. Goodwill
cannot exist in a. vacuum but only in connection with the business which uses the trade
mark.12 The goodwill of a business is a form of legal property which represents the
connection between the business of the trader and his customers.
13
Goodwill is territorial in
nature. Reputation, on the other hand, is a matter of fact which depends on the extent to
which the distinguishing indicia is known to the public.]4 While goodwill cannot exist
without any trading activity in this country, a trade mark's reputation can exist without
goodwill.
Although the law of passing off protects the goodwill of a trader's business, the notion of
reputation is increasingly given prominence in some jurisdictions. This is a direct result of the
growth of international trade, worldwide travel and advancement in communication
technology such as radio, television and the Internet. In a sense, reputation is relevant to the
law of passing off because where the goods or services passed off by another trader are
inferior, the reputation of the trade mark will be adversely affected which, in tum, will injure
6 [1994] 2 MLJ 770 at 781 per Gunn Chit Tuan CJ (Malaya).
1 {1990] RPC 341.
8 Star Industrial Co Ltd v Yap Kwee Kor, supra nl.
9 Compagnie Genera/e Des Eaux v Compagnie Genera/e Des Eam Sdn Bhd [1993] 1 MLJ 55 (interlocutory
~roceedings), [1996] 3 AMR 4015 (trial of action).
0[1901] AC 217 at 223.
11 Star Industrial Co Ltd v Yap Kwee Kor, supra nl at 155 per Lord Diplock, H & R Johnson Tiles Ltd & Anor v
H & R Johnson (M) Bhd {1998] 4 MLJ 13, Electro Cad Australia Pty Ltd & Ors v Mejati RCS Sdn Bhd & Ors
[1998] 3 MLJ 422.
12 Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budejovicky Budvar NP [1984] FSR 413.
13 Kitchin, David (et al), Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names, 13
m
ed (London, Sweet & Maxwell,
2001) at para 14-80.
14 Kitchin, ibid.
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the goodwill in the business of the trader. In addition, in proving misrepresentation, which is
an essential element in passing off actions, the reputation of the trade mark in the sense of it
being recognised by a sufficiently large proportion of the public is often called into question.
The extent to which foreign traders are required to conduct business locally in order to
generate local goodwill is clearly important to those traders who wish to institute passing off
actions. In Athletes Foot Marketing Associates Inc v Cobra Sports Ltd and Another."
Walthon J identified two approaches which courts had adopted to determine whether foreign
traders had goodwill to commence passing off actions. The first approach, or the 'hard line'
school of thought, adopts the orthodox view that a foreign trader must carry on some business
activity within the jurisdiction in order to acquire a locally situated goodwill. Such an
approach operates on the basis that goodwill is exclusively territorial and if the business is
carried on in several countries, a separate goodwill attaches to it in each of these countries.
An instance of the 'hard line' school of thought is the case of Alain Bernardin et Compagnie
v Pavilion Properties Ltd.16 In that case, the plaintiff, who was the proprietor of the 'Crazy
Horse Saloon' in Paris, applied for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendant from
carrying on business under the same name in London. Pennycuick J refused to grant an
interlocutory injunction because the plaintiff had not conducted any business activity in the
United Kingdom to create goodwill, albeit he had customers from the United Kingdom The
second approach, or the 'soft line' school of thought, does not require actual trade, business
activity or customers within the jurisdiction for goodwill to be established. This approach
recognises that an international business may have one individual goodwill which transcends
territorial boundaries. Nevertheless, there must be evidence of reputation in the jurisdiction in
which the passing off action is brought although business activities need not be carried on
within that jurisdiction.17 This view was adopted by Graham J in Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream
Co v Gutman18 and Maxim's Ltd v Dye.19 In Baskin-Robbins case,20the plaintiffs, who were a
famous American ice-cream chain, had an international reputation but had not traded in
England. The defendants began operating an ice-cream parlour in England using a similar
style and logo as the plaintiffs. Graham J recognised that some businesses were truly
international in character and the reputation as well as the goodwill attaching to them cannot
in fact help being international also. His Lordship refused to confine goodwill to geographical
areas and held that international reputation could protect plaintiffs who do not trade within
the jurisdiction. His Lordship applied the same analysis in Maxim's Ltd case
21
where the
plaintiffs, who were the owners of the famous Parisian restaurant, had successfully objected
to the use of the same name for a restaurant in England. Graham J was of the view that the
plaintiffs had sufficient reputation in England even though they did not have any business
there.
In Malaysia, prior to the recent decision in Thrifty Rent-A-Car System Inc v Thrifty Rent-A-
Car Sdn Bhd & Anor,22 Malaysian judges followed the 'hard-line' school of thought
approach. While the Malaysian courts insist on the requirement of goodwill, judges have
been liberal in accepting evidence of slight local trading as sufficient to establish goodwill.
15 [1980] RPC 343 at 349.
16 [1967] RPC 581.
11 This view was adopted by Graham J in Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co v Gutman [1976] FSR 545 and
Maxim's Ltd v Dye [1977] FSR 364.
II [1976] FSR 545.
19 [1977] FSR 364.
20 Supra n18.
21 Supra n19.
22 Supra n3.
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For instance, in Dun & Bradstreet (Singapore) Pte Ltd & Anor v Dun & Bradstreet
(Malaysia) Sdn Bhd,23 it was held that a foreign company which entered into a number of
contracts with local companies had sufficient business activity to establish goodwill. In that
case, the first plaintiff was the Singapore subsidiary of the second plaintiff. The second
plaintiff were members of an established group of international companies which enjoyed a
substantial reputation, particularly in credit information services. According to the first
plaintiff, they had extended their business to Malaysia in 1989 by placing advertisements in
local newspapers recruiting candidates for the position of sales executive to co-ordinate sales
of the first plaintiffs business in Malaysia. The first plaintiff had also exhibited no less than
thirty-one subscription agreements entered into between the first plaintiff and various
Malaysian entities. Sometime in early 1992, the first plaintiff decided to incorporate a
company in Malaysia as part of its business expansion. However, the first plaintiff discovered
that they could not do so as the name 'Dun & Bradstreet' had already been taken up by the
defendant. The plaintiffs thus brought an action to restrain the defendant from passing off the
business of the plaintiffs as that of the defendant by the use of the name 'Dun & Bradstreet'.
It was argued by the defendant that as the plaintiffs had neither obtained permission to
conduct business in Malaysia nor registered any company there, there could not have been
any goodwill to protect. The presiding judge, Malek J (as he then was), held that reputation
and some market activity in the jurisdiction were sufficient to establish a business goodwill
entitled to protection. His Lordship distinguished the 'hard-line' approach adopted in
Athlete's Foot Marketing Associates Inc v Cobra Sports Ltd and Another
24
on the facts
because the plaintiffs in the case before his Lordship had entered into contracts with
Malaysian companies and had acquired the requisite goodwill to maintain a passing off
action. An interlocutory injunction was thus granted in favour of the plaintiffs.
In Thrifty Rent-A-Car System, Inc v Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sdn Bhd & Anor." Faiza Tamby Chik
J in the High Court stated, in obiter, that a more liberal and flexible approach in determining
whether a foreign plaintiff had acquired goodwill should be adopted. In that case, the
appellant was an American company established in 1958. It was in the business of, inter alia,
automobile rental and travel agency services using the 'THRIFTY' mark. It was the
registered proprietor of the 'THRIFTY' mark in many countries in the world. The appellant
had advertised and promoted its business extensively in Malaysia and Singapore. In addition,
its local franchisee had been using the 'THRIFTY' mark since early 1985. The first
respondent, a Malaysian company, filed an application to register the 'THRIFTY RENT-A-
CAR' mark in respect of stationery materials. Both the first respondent's and appellant's
marks were identical. The appellant's action against the respondents was based on two causes
of action. The first relates to opposition to the registration of the first respondent's trade mark
under the Trade Marks Act 1976?6 The second is concerned with the law of passing off. With
regard to passing off, the appellant argued that the use or registration of the 'THRIFTY' mark
by the first respondent constituted passing off. The court found that the appellant had
acquired substantial goodwill and reputation in the 'THRIFTY' mark by virtue of extensive
use and promotion of its business and services. On the facts of the case, the court found that
the action for passing off had been made out. Although it was clear that the appellant had
23 [1993] 2 AMR 46. See similar decisions in earlier cases such as Compagnie Generale Des Eaux v Compagnie
General Des Eaux Sdn Bhd [1993] 2 AMR 46 and Westpac Banking Corp v Goodmaker Leasing Corporation
Bhd &Anor 8 IPR 9.
2~ Supra n15.
25 Supra n3.
26 As the cause of action based on the Trade Marks Act 1976 was concerned with the statutory protection of
trade marks, this paper will not discuss this aspect of the appellant's claim.
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been conducting business in Malaysia through its franchisee and therefore had acquired local
goodwill, the judge cited a number of foreign decisions which had held that a passing off
action could be maintained despite the absence of local trading activity. On this point, the
judge stated as follows??
I think the courts in Malaysia should adopt a more liberal and flexible approach in
evaluating whether a foreign plaintiff has acquired goodwill or reputation, as is the
trend in other Commonwealth jurisdictions in recent years. In ConAgra Inc vMe/lain
Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd 23 IPR 93, the Full Federal Court of Australia held that it is not
necessary that a plaintiff, to maintain a passing-off action, have a place of business in
Australia nor for his goods to be sold in that country. It is sufficient if his goods have
a reputation (as opposed to goodwill) in Australia among persons of a sufficient
degree to establish there is likelihood of deception among consumers and damage to
his reputation. Reputation may be proved by a variety of means including
advertisements in various forms of media and exposure of people within the forum to
the goods of the overseas owner. The Court also held that it is necessary for the
plaintiff to establish that within the jurisdiction there are a substantial number of
persons who are aware of the plaintiffs product and these persons may be residents or
visitors from outside the jurisdiction.
It is evident from the above passage that Faiza Tamby Chik J advocated the acceptance of
reputation, instead of goodwill, as sufficient for a passing off action. Such an approach
displaces goodwill as the essential basis of an action for passing off. It substitutes goodwill as
the legal property protected by the law of passing off with reputation, which is a non-
proprietary interest. It is submitted that protecting the reputation of a trade mark is contrary to
the established principle laid down in Spalding (AG) & Bros vAW Gamage Lt(P that there is
no right of property in a trade mark per se.
Misrepresentation and well-known trade marks
Passing off is a tort of misrepresentation and, thus, misrepresentation is an essential element
of all passing off actions. The misrepresentation may be express or implied.
29
It is a
prerequisite that the misrepresentation must have deceived or is likely to deceive the
prospective customer." The most common form of misrepresentation is to the effect that the
goods or services of the defendant are those of the plaintiff
31
or are associated with the
plaintiff.32 The categories of misrepresentation are not closed as is evident particularly from
cases involving the use of well-known trade marks on the Internet. This follows from the
flexibility of the tort of passing off in meeting new forms of unfair trading.
Where well-known trade marks are concerned, the recent case of Mclionald's v McCurry
Restaurant (KL) Sdn Bhcf3 seems to suggest that judges are more amenable to find the
27 Supra n3 at 583.
28 Supran2.
29 Seet Chuan Seng & Anor v Tee Yih Jia Foods Manufacturing Pte Ltd [1994] 2 MLJ 770 at 782 per Gunn Chit
Tuan CJ (Malaya).
30 Ibid.
31 This is also the earliest form of misrepresentation in passing off.
n For the categories of misrepresentation which have been recognised as actionable in passing off, see Wadlow,
Christopher, The Law of Passing-Off: Unfair Competition by Misrepresentation, 3
rd
ed (London, Sweet &
Maxwell, 2004) at Chapter 7.
33 Supra n4.
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existence of misrepresentation and, hence, confusion among the public, In that case, the High
Court decided that the well-known McDonald's Corporation had the exclusive right to the
use of the prefix 'Mc' over items of food even though the food items were not the typical
burger and fries but were Asian in nature. The defendant, which was a 24-hour open-air
restaurant serving Malaysian Indian cuisine, operated under the name McCurry Restaurant
(KL) Sdn Bhd in Kuala Lumpur. It had a signage which featured colours that were distinctive
of McDonald's restaurants. Its red and gold logo also featured a chicken giving a thumbs-up
sign. Despite the difference in the type of foods served, the High Court judge found that the
defendant's use of the prefix 'Me' could give rise to confusion and deception. As the action
was brought based on the law of passing off, the High Court judge did not restrict herself to
merely a comparison of both marks but also took into account the fact that the defendant's
signage featured colours which were distinctive of the plaintiff. The court restrained the
defendant from using the 'Mc' prefix. The court further found that the act of the defendant
could cause an erosion to the singularity which the plaintiff had enjoyed vis-A-vis the prefix
'Me'. The effect of this decision is to grant the plaintiff a monopoly over the prefix 'Mc' on
all food products. The defendant has appealed to the Court of Appeal against this decision.
It is humbly submitted that judges should be wary of allowing any party to monopolise
common words. The prefix 'Mc' is a common Scottish surname. The McDonald's mark and
McCurry's mark have no resemblance to each other and, conceptually, both marks are
different. The products in both cases are different although they are food items. It is difficult
to understand how the judge came to the conclusion that likelihood of confusion existed on
the part of the public. The issue of likelihood of confusion has to be looked at globally taking
into account all the circumstances, such as the similarities between the goods and the
impression which the marks leave in the public's mind.
Dilution as a form of damage
Since the law of passing off is concerned with misrepresentations made by one trader which
damage the business goodwill of another, it is essential that the defendant's misrepresentation
should be likely to cause damage to the business goodwill.i" Although actual' damage need
not have occurred, it must at least be proved that there is a likelihood of damage." Various
heads of damage have been recognised as actionable in a passing off action, the most
common being loss of sales. Other heads of damage which have been recognised by local
courts, though less frequently, are injurious asscciation/" devaluation of the plaintiffs
reputation" exposure to liability or risk of Iitlgation." loss of control over the plaintiff's
34 Erven Warnink BV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd, supra n5.
35 Compagnie Generale Des Eaux v Compagnie Generale Des Eaux Sdn Bhd, supra n23.
36 Compagnie Generale Des Eaux v Compagnie Generale Des Eaux Sdn Bhd, ibid, Revertex Ltd & Anor v Slim
Rivertex Sdn Bhd & Ors [1991] 1 MLJ 508, H & R Johnson Tiles Ltd & Anor v H & R Johnson (M) Bhd [1998]
4 MLJ 13.
37 York Pacific Holdings Ltd v U-Re Auto Sdn Bhd [1998] 5 MLJ 84 where the defendants sold inferior quality
coupler units under the same trade mark as the plaintiff.
38 York Pacific Holdings Ltd v U-Re Auto Sdn Bhd, ibid, where the inferior quality coupler units sold by the
defendant under the same trade mark as the plaintiffs units might fail while in use on trailers resulting in serious
accidents. This might expose the plaintiff to litigation even though the litigation might be successfully defended.
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reputation." false connection that leads to the disfavour of the customers'" and loss of
opportunities for brand extension, including licensing."
More recently, dilution of trade marks have been accepted by Malaysian courts as a form of
actionable damage in passing off. In The Scotch Whisky Association & Anor v Ewein Winery
(M) Sdn Bhd,42 the first plaintiff had the responsibility, inter alia, of protecting and defending
the interests of the well-known 'Scotch Whisky' trade throughout the world. The second
plaintiff were distillers, blenders and exporters of 'Scotch Whisky', being spirits distilled
solely in Scotland in a regulated stringent manner. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants,
a locally incorporated company which carried on the business of manufacturers of liquor, had
passed off their spirits which were not distilled in Scotland, as and for 'Scotch Whisky'. The
acts of passing off complained by the plaintiffs included features of get-up with visual
representations and labels suggesting Scottish origin. The plaintiffs also contended that the
defendants' misrepresentation had eroded the distinctiveness of the description 'Scotch
Whisky'. Abdul Hamid Mohamad J adopted the test formulated by Lord Diplock in Erven
Warnink BV v J Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltct3 and found the defendants liable for passing off.
His Lordship held that the defendants' act of misrepresenting their products as 'Scotch
Whisky' was likely to confuse the public into thinking that the defendants' products were
indeed 'Scotch Whisky' .44 The interesting aspect of the judgment which impacts most
significantly on the law of passing off in Malaysia relates to the issue of damage. Apart from
granting the plaintiffs the remedies which they had sought." the judge stated that if locally
produced whiskies were widely sold as 'Scotch Whisky', the meaning of 'Scotch Whisky'
would be diluted and might eventually become generic to the detriment of real 'Scotch
Whisky' producers.l'' Genericisation occurs where the trade mark becomes descriptive of the
product itself, thereby losing its distinctiveness and ability to denote the business of the trade
mark owner. The finding of dilution as a form of damage in that case is tantamount to the
court protecting the prestige worth and market value ofthe name 'Scotch Whisky' as well as
preventing the possibility of dilution to that prestige.47
Apart from genericisation, dilution of a trade mark may also take the form of erosion of the
uniqueness of a trade name or mark. This was considered by Kamalanathan Ratnam Je (as he
then was) in Service Master (M) Sdn Bhd vMHL ServiceMaster Sdn Bhd & Anor and another
application.r' In that case, the plaintiffs were involved in the provision of air-conditioning
systems and electrical installations while the defendants' activities were in the provision of
support management services particularly in the area of healthcare facilities in hospitals. The
plaintiffs brought a passing off action against the defendants for adopting the word
'ServiceMaster' in their business name, thereby passing off their business for that of the
39 Compagnie Generale Des Eaux v Compagnie General Des Eaux Sdn Bhd, supra n23.
40 Lord's Tailor Sdn Bhd v Seow Sing For (t/a Tukang Jahit Lord's) [1993] 4 CLJ 165, Horne Asia Sdn Bhd &
Anor v Ozvent (M) Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors [1995] 1AMR 677.
41 Compagnie Generale Des Eaux v Compagnie General Des Eaux Sdn Bhd, supra n23.
42 [1999] 6 MLJ 280.
43 Supra n5.
44 Supra n42 at 298.
4S The remedies granted by the court included an injunction to restrain the defendants from continuing with their
acts of passing off and account of profits.
46 Supra n42 at 303.
47 The difficulty of reconciling the dilution doctrine with the fundamental principle that passing off does not
protect the trade mark per se has been highlighted by a number of commentators. In particular, see Carty, Hazel,
'Dilution and Passing Off: Cause for Concern' (1996) 112 LQR 632.
48 [1998] 5ML] 378.
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plaintiffs. The judge dismissed the action for passing off as he found that the plaintiffs had
failed to establish that they had goodwill in the defendants' business activity. In considering
damage, the court found that the plaintiffs had not suffered any loss of sales through the
defendants adopting a similar name for their business. In addition, the judge also held that the
plaintiffs had not shown any erosion of their name." This aspect of the judge's decision
suggests that local courts may be willing to protect a trade name or mark against erosion if
evidence of such a damage is established.
The case of Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas) & Ors v Khoo Nee Kionlo provides further
support that the doctrine of dilution of trade marks is a recognised facet of the law of passing
off in this country. The plaintiffs in that case were well-known national petroleum
corporations in Malaysia and conducted businesses under the trade mark 'Petronas'. The
defendant, who was the sole proprietor of a business, registered several domain names
comprising the word 'petronas'. The domain names included 'petronas-dagangan.com',
'petronasgas.com', 'petronasdagangan.com' and 'mypetronas.com'. The intention of the
defendant was to sell those domain names. Apart from that, the defendant had also
maintained a website with the address 'www.petronasgas.corn' which provided information
about the plaintiffs. Consequently, the plaintiffs sought an injunction against the defendant,
inter alia, for passing off and defamation." In an application for an inter parte interlocutory
injunction, the court relied on the English Court of Appeal's decision in British
Telecommunications pIc and Another v One in A Million Ltd & Ors and Other Actions52 to
arrive at its conclusion that the domain names containing the word 'petronas' amounted to
passing off the defendant's business as that of the plaintiffs. Citing important passages from
the British Telecommunications case,53 Su Geok Yiam JC held that the registration by the
defendant of domain names comprising the plaintiffs' well-known trade mark resulted in an
erosion of the exclusive goodwill in the well-known trade mark and would, consequently,
damage the reputation of the mark. The court also found that the defendant's domain names
comprised instruments of fraud and any realistic use of the domain names ~ould result in
passing off. Since there were serious questions to be tried in the case, the court granted an
interlocutory injunction against the defendant.
While these cases suggest that local judges are amenable to the concept of dilution of well-
known trade marks, fundamental aspects of the law of dilution, such as what actually
constitutes dilution of trade marks and how the concept would fit into the landscape of the
law of passing off in this country, need to be further explored by the local judges. The Privy
Council's decision in Star Industrial Company Ltd v Yap Kwee Kor54 that there is no right of
property in a plaintiffs trade mark per se may militate against the easy development of the
dilution doctrine within the confines of the law of passing off. This is because the remedy of
dilution of trade marks focuses on the trade mark per se since it is concerned with preventing
the erosion of the singularity and exclusivity of the trade mark to call to mind a specific
product.
49 Ibid at 392.
50 [2003] 4 eLJ 303.
51 The court clarified that the disputed domain names had been transferred to the first plaintiff by the time the
case came before the court because of the dispute resolution proceedings filed by the plaintiffs with the World
Intellectual Property Organisation.
52 [1999] FSR l.
53 Ibid.
S4 Supra nl.
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Conclusion
From the above discussion, it may be surmised that Malaysian judges are keen to develop the
law of passing off to meet the needs and demands of international trade. This may be seen in
the liberal and pragmatic approach of Malaysian courts in finding the existence of goodwill
where a foreign trade mark owner has minimal business activity in the country, the ease of
finding the existence of misrepresentation and confusion where well-known trade marks are
involved and the acceptance of dilution of trade marks as a form of actionable damage in
passing off. While these may be the court's response to commercial progress, there is always
the need to be careful that the law of passing off should not be indiscriminately extended
beyond its rationale. There is a need to adhere to the classic trinity of goodwill,
misrepresentation and damage. If the tort is not kept within bounds, it may ultimately result
in competition being stifled.
Dr Tay Pek San
Senior Lecturer
Faculty of Law
University of Malaya
Kuala Lumpur
9
